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Abstract
Patch adversarial attacks on images, in which
the attacker can distort pixels within a region of
bounded size, are an important threat model since
they provide a quantitative model for physical
adversarial attacks. In this paper, we introduce
a certifiable defense against patch attacks that
guarantees for a given image and patch attack
size, no patch adversarial examples exist. Our
method is related to the broad class of random-
ized smoothing robustness schemes which provide
high-confidence probabilistic robustness certifi-
cates. By exploiting the fact that patch attacks are
more constrained than general sparse attacks, we
derive meaningfully large robustness certificates.
Additionally, the algorithm we propose is de-
randomized, providing deterministic certificates.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists only
one prior method for certifiable defense against
patch attacks, which relies on interval bound prop-
agation. While this sole existing method performs
well on MNIST, it has several limitations: it re-
quires computationally expensive training, does
not scale to ImageNet, and performs poorly on
CIFAR-10. In contrast, our proposed method ef-
fectively addresses all of these issues: our clas-
sifier can be trained quickly, achieves high clean
and certified robust accuracy on CIFAR-10, and
provides certificates at the ImageNet scale. For
example, for a 5× 5 patch attack on CIFAR-10,
our method achieves up to around 57.8% certified
accuracy (with a classifier around 83.9% clean
accuracy), compared to at most 30.3% certified
accuracy for the existing method (with a classifier
with around 47.8% clean accuracy), effectively
establishing a new state-of-the-art. Code is avail-
able at https://github.com/alevine0/
patchSmoothing.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, adversarial attacks have become a topic of
great interest in machine learning. (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Madry et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017) However, in
many instances the threat models considered for these at-
tacks, such as small L∞ distortions to every pixel of an
image, implicitly require the attacker to be able to directly
interfere with the input to a neural network: this represents
only a limited practical threat. (We recognize that (Kurakin
et al., 2018) has shown that L∞ attacks may be effective
even when the distorted image has been printed and re-
photographed, but this is clearly a limited setting.) However,
the development of physical adversarial attacks (Eykholt
et al., 2018), in which small visible changes are made to real
world objects in order to disrupt classification of images of
these objects, represents a more concerning security threat.
Physical adversarial attacks can often be modeled as patch
adversarial attacks, in which the attacker can make arbitrary
changes to pixels within a region of bounded size. Indeed,
there is often a direct relationship between the two: for
example, the universal patch attack proposed by (Brown
et al., 2017) is effective as a physical sticker. In that attack,
the pixels of the attack do not depend on the attacked image.
Image-specific patch attacks have also been proposed, such
as LaVAN (Karmon et al., 2018), which reduces ImageNet
classification accuracy to 0% using only a 42 × 42 pixel
square patch (on images of size 299× 299). In this paper,
we also consider attacks on square patches, of size m×m.
Practical defenses against patch adversarial attacks have
been proposed (Hayes, 2018; Naseer et al., 2018). For the
aforementioned 42× 42 pixel attacks on ImageNet, (Naseer
et al., 2018) claims the current state-of-the-art practical
defense. However, (Chiang et al., 2020) has recently bro-
ken this defense, reducing classification accuracy on Im-
ageNet to 14%. In the same work, (Chiang et al., 2020)
also proposes the first certified defense against patch ad-
versarial attacks, which uses interval bound propagation
(Gowal et al., 2018). In a certifiably robust classification
scheme, in addition to providing a classification for each
image, the classifier may also return an assurance that the
classification will provably not change under any distortion
of a certain magnitude and threat model. One then both
reports the clean accuracy (normal accuracy) of the model,
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as well as the certified accuracy (percent of images which
are both correctly classified, and for which it is guaranteed
that the classification will not change under a certain attack
type). Certified defenses are preferable to practical defences
because they guarantee that no future adversary (under a
certain threat model) will be effective against the defense.
The certified defense proposed by (Chiang et al., 2020), how-
ever, can not defend against the attack proposed by (Chiang
et al., 2020). Specifically, while this certified defense per-
forms well on MNIST, it achieves poor certified accuracy on
CIFAR-10 and, to quote, “is unlikely to scale to ImageNet.”
In this work, we propose a certified defense against patch
adversarial attacks which overcomes these issues:
Dataset and Chiang et al. Our method
Attack Size Certified Acc Certified Acc
(Clean Acc) (Clean Acc)
MNIST 5× 5 60.4% 52.83%
(92.0%) (96.66%)
CIFAR 5× 5 30.3% 57.83%
(47.8%) (83.93%)
ImageNet 42× 42 N/A 14.5%
(43.1%)
Table 1. Comparison of the certified accuracy of our defense
scheme, versus (Chiang et al., 2020). For each technique, we
report the certified and clean accuracies of the model with parame-
ters giving the highest certified accuracy.
We note that our method has top-1 certified accuracy on
ImageNet classification which is approximately equal to
the 14% empirical accuracy of the state-of-the art practical
defense (Naseer et al., 2018) under the attack proposed by
(Chiang et al., 2020) (although our clean accuracy is lower,
43% vs. 71%). The certified defense proposed by (Chiang
et al., 2020) also has a computationally expensive training
algorithm: the training time for the reported best model was
8.4 GPU hours using NVIDIA 2080 Ti GPUs. Our MNIST
models, by contrast, took approximately 1.0 GPU hour to
train on the same model of GPU.
Our certifiably robust classification scheme is based on ran-
domized smoothing, a class of techniques for certifiably
robust classification which has been proposed for various
threat models, including L2 (Li et al., 2018; Cohen et al.,
2019; Salman et al., 2019), L1 (Lecuyer et al., 2019; Teng
et al., 2020), L0 (Lee et al., 2019; Levine & Feizi, 2019a),
and Wasserstein (Levine & Feizi, 2019b) metrics. All of
these methods rely on a similar mechanism where noisy
versions of an input image x are used in the classification.
Such noisy inputs are created either by adding random noise
to all pixels (Lecuyer et al., 2019) or by removing (ablating)
some of the pixels (Levine & Feizi, 2019a). A large number
of noisy images are then classified by a base classifier and
then the consensus of these classifications is reported as the
final classification result. For an adversarial image x′ at a
bounded distance from x, the probability distributions of
possible noisy images which can be produced from x and x′
will substantially overlap. This implies that, if a sufficiently
large fraction of noisy images derived from x are classified
to some class c, then with high probability, a plurality of
noisy images derived from x′ will also be assigned to this
class. While recent work (Kumar et al., 2020; Blum et al.,
2020; Yang et al., 2020) has shown that these techniques
may not extend to certain metrics (particularly the L∞ met-
ric) in the classification setting, randomized smoothing has
also been extended to protect against threat models beyond
inference-time attacks on classification, to defend against
attacks on machine learning interpretation (Levine et al.,
2019) and poisoning attacks (Rosenfeld et al., 2020).
In this paper, we focus on patch adversarial attacks which
can be considered as a special case ofL0 (sparse) adversarial
attacks: in an L0 attack, the adversary can choose a limited
number of pixels and apply unbounded distortions to them.
A patch adversarial attack is therefore a restricted version
of a sparse adversarial attack: the attacker is additionally
constrained to selecting only a block of adjacent pixels to
attack, rather than any arbitrary pixels.
The current state-of-the-art certified defense against sparse
adversarial attacks is a randomized smoothing method pro-
posed by (Levine & Feizi, 2019a). In this method, a base
classifier, f(x), is trained to make classifications based on
only a small number of randomly-selected pixels: the rest
of the image is ablated, meaning that it is encoded as a null
value. At test time, the final classification g(x) is taken
as the class most likely to be returned by f on a randomly
ablated version of the image. (In practice, g is estimated by
evaluating f on large random samples of possible ablations.)
Note that regardless of the choice of pixels that an adversary
might distort, the probability that any of these pixels is also
one of the pixels present in each particular ablated sample
used by the base classifier is bounded. Then if the base
classifier returns the correct classification on a sufficiently
large proportion of ablated images, one can conclude that
no adversarial examples with fewer than a certain number
of distorted pixels exist.
In practice, we find that applying this scheme directly to
patch attacks yields poor results (Table 2). This is because
the defense proposed in (Levine & Feizi, 2019a) does not
incorporate the additional structure of the attack. In particu-
lar, for patch attacks, we can use the fact that the attacked
pixels form a contiguous square to develop a more effective
defense. In this paper, we propose a structured ablation
scheme, where instead of independently selecting pixels to
use for classification, we select pixels in a correlated way in
order to reduce the probability that the adversarial patch is
sampled. In Theorems 1 and 2, we characterize the robust-
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ness certificates of proposed structured ablation methods
against patch adversarial attacks. Empirically, structured
ablation certificates yields much improved certified accu-
racy to patch attacks, compared to the naive L0 certificate.
(52.83% for 5× 5 patches on MNIST, compared to 8.04%.)
By reducing the total number of possible ablations of an
image, structured ablation also allows us to de-randomize
our algorithm, yielding improved, deterministic certificates.
For L0 robustness, (Levine & Feizi, 2019a) achieves the
largest median certificates on MNIST by using a base clas-
sifier f which classifies using only 45 out of 784 pixels.
Note that there are
(
784
45
) ≈ 4 × 1073 ways to make this
selection. It is therefore not feasible to evaluate precisely
the probability that f(x) returns any particular class c: one
must estimate this based on random samples, following tech-
niques originally developed by (Cohen et al., 2019) for L2
randomized smoothing. Using our proposed methods, the
number of possible ablations is small enough so that it is
tractable to classify using all possible ablations: we can
exactly evaluate the probability that f(x) returns each class.
Our certificate is therefore exact, rather than probabilistic:
we know what f returns given each possible ablated image
as input, and we know the maximum number of these classi-
fications which could possibly be distorted by the adversary,
so we can determine whether or not the plurality classifi-
cation could change using simple counting. Determinism
provides additional benefits, which we explore in Sections
2.6 and 3.2. In a concurrent work, (Rosenfeld et al., 2020)
has also independently proposed a de-randomized version
of a randomized smoothing technique. However, the threat
model of that work is quite different: (Rosenfeld et al., 2020)
develops a smoothing defense against label-flipping poison-
ing (training-time) attacks, where the adversary is able to
change the label of a bounded number of training samples.
Notably, (Rosenfeld et al., 2020)‘s result only applies di-
rectly to linear base classifiers (although in the particular
threat model considered, the inputs to this linear classifier
may be nonlinear features learned from the unlabeled train-
ing data, which the adversary cannot perturb). By restricting
to linear classifiers, (Rosenfeld et al., 2020) is able to ana-
lytically determine the probabilities of f(x) returning each
class. By contrast, our de-randomized smoothing technique
for inference-time patch attacks makes no restriction on
the architecture of the base classifier f , in practice a deep
convolutional network.
2. Certifiable Defenses against Patch Attacks
2.1. Sparse Ablation (Levine & Feizi, 2019a)
As mentioned in the introduction, patch attacks can be re-
garded as a restricted case of L0 attacks. In particular, let ρ
be the magnitude of an L0 adversarial attack: the attacker
modifies ρ pixels and leaves the rest unchanged. A patch
attack, with an m ×m adversarial patch, is also an L0 at-
tack, with ρ = m2. We can then attempt to apply existing
certifiably robust classification schemes for the L0 threat
model to the patch attack threat model: we simply need to
certify to an L0 radius of ρ = m2. Consider specifically the
L0 smoothing-based certifiably robust classifier introduced
by (Levine & Feizi, 2019a). In this classification scheme,
given an input image x, the base classifier f classifies a
large number of distinct randomly-ablated versions of x, in
each of which only k pixels of the original image are ran-
domly and independently selected to be retained and used
by the base classifier f . Therefore, for any choice of ρ pixels
that the attacker could choose to attack, the probability that
any of these ρ pixels is also one of the k pixels used in f ’s
classification is:
∆ := Pr(f uses attacked pixels)
∆ = 1−
(
hw−ρ
k
)(
hw
k
) ≈ k ρ
hw
=
km2
hw
(k, ρ << hw)
where ρ is the number of attacked pixels, k is the number of
retained pixels used by the base classifier, and the overall
dimensions of the input image x are h× w. To understand
this, note that the classifier has k opportunities to choose an
attacked pixel, and ρ out of hw pixels are attacked. Clearly,
if f does not use any of the attacked pixels, then its output
will not be corrupted by the attacker. Therefore, the attacker
can change the output of f(x) with probability at most ∆.
Let c be the majority classification at x (i.,e., g(x) = c). If
f(x) = c with probability greater than 0.5+∆, then for any
distorted image x′, one can conclude that f(x′) = c with
probability greater than 0.5, and therefore that g(x′) = c.
While this technique produces state-of-the art guarantees
against general L0 attacks, it yields rather poor certified
accuracies when applied to patch attacks, because it does
not take advantage of the structure of the attack (Table 2).
Retained Classification Certified
pixels k accuracy accuracy
5 32.32% 8.04%
10 74.90% 5.73%
15 86.09% 4.53%
20 90.29% 0.15%
25 93.05% 0
Table 2. Certified accuracy to 5× 5 adversarial patches on MNIST
from directly applying L0 smoothing as proposed by (Levine &
Feizi, 2019a). Note that with L0 smoothing, the geometry of the
attack is not taken into consideration: these are therefore actually
certified accuracies for any L0 attack on up to ρ = 25 pixels. The
certificates are probabilistic, with 95% confidence.
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Figure 1. Likelihood of selecting a pixel which is part of the at-
tacked patch (red) for (a) sparse randomized ablation, as proposed
by (Levine & Feizi, 2019a) (b) Structured ablation, using a block
of size s = 2. In both cases, k = 4 pixels are retained. However,
in the sparse case, if any of the four independently-selected pixels
sample the patch, then the classification may be impacted: this oc-
curs with probability ∆ = 1− (64−9
4
)
/
(
64
4
) ≈ 0.463. In contrast,
the probability that the block overlaps with the adversarial patch is
only 16
64
= 0.25.
2.2. Structured Ablation
In order to exploit the restricted nature of patch attacks,
we propose two structured ablation methods, which select
correlated groups of pixels in order to reduce the probability
∆ that the adversarial patch is sampled:
• Block Smoothing: In this method, we select a single
s × s square block of pixels, and ablate the rest of
the image. The number of retained pixels is then k =
s2. Note that for an m × m adversarial patch, out
of the h× w possible selections for blocks to use for
classification, (m+ s− 1)2 of them will intersect the
patch. Then we have:
∆block =
(m+ s− 1)2
hw
=
(m+
√
k − 1)2
hw
<
4 max(m2, k)
hw
.
(1)
As illustrated in Figure 1, this implies a substantially
decreased probability of intersecting the adversarial
patch, compared to sampling k pixels independently.
• Band Smoothing: In this method, we select a single
band (a column or a row) of pixels of width s, and
ablate the rest of the image. In the case of a column,
the number of retained pixels is then k = sh. For
an m × m adversarial patch, out of the w possible
selections for bands to use for classification, m+ s− 1
of them will intersect the patch. Then we have:
∆col. =
m+ s− 1
w
=
m+ k/h− 1
w
<
max(hm, k)
hw
.
(2)
Figure 2. Comparison of the L0 defense proposed by (Levine &
Feizi, 2019a) to our proposed defenses on MNIST, for a 5×5 patch
attack. While sampling a single block or band slightly increases
the probability ∆ that an adversarially distorted pixel is used, the
large increase in the total number of retained pixels, and therefore
the base classifier accuracy, more than makes up for this increase
in ∆. However, the number of retained pixels alone does not
perfectly correspond to higher base classifier accuracy: while the
band method uses slightly fewer pixels than the block method, the
base classifier has substantially higher accuracy, leading to higher
certified accuracy. For each method, we use hyperparameters
optimized for highest certified robust accuracy. Note that the
L0 certificate is probabilistic (with 95% confidence) while our
certificates are deterministic.
For both of these methods, it is tractable to use the base clas-
sifier to classify all possible ablated versions of an image
(there are hw possible ablations for block smoothing, and
w for column smoothing): this allows us to exactly com-
pute g(x), and to compute deterministic certificates. Our
experiments show that structured ablation produces higher
certified accuracy than L0 sparse ablation. This is because,
for similar values of ∆, structured ablation methods yield
much higher base classifier accuracies. (Figure 2). Empiri-
cally, we find that the band method (and specifically, column
smoothing) produces the most certifiably robust classifiers
(Tables 4,5). In Section 3.3, we explore structured ablation
using multiple blocks or bands of pixels.
2.3. Notation for Algorithms
Following the notation of (Levine & Feizi, 2019a), let S be
the set of possible values for a pixel in an input image. Be-
cause our base classifier only uses a subset of the image, we
must have a way to encode missing pixels: let NULL repre-
sent the absence of information about a pixel, and let SNULL
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Figure 3. Function of the ABLATE operators. Ablated pixels are
represented in green. Note that the retained regions wrap around.
be the set S∪{NULL}. Let n be the number of classes in the
classification problem. We will assume that our base clas-
sifier f is a deterministic function in SNULLh×w → [0, 1]n,
with
∑n−1
i=0 fi(·) = 1. In other words, the base classifier
will take an image with some pixels ablated to NULL and
others retained, and output softmaxed logits representing
the confidence that the classifier has in each class. As a
practical matter, f can easily be represented as a neural net-
work: we encode the additional NULL symbol in the input
in the same manner described by (Levine & Feizi, 2019a)
for each dataset tested. For the block smoothing method, we
will define the operation ABLATEblock(x, s, (i, j)), which
will take an image x ∈ Sh×w, and return an ablated image
in SNULLh×w that retains only the pixels in a s × s block
with upper-left corner (i, j), and ablates the rest. For the
column (or row, by symmetry) smoothing method, similarly
define ABLATEcol.(x, s, i), which retains only a column of
width s starting at x = i. In both cases, if the retained block
or column would extend beyond the size of the image, the
retained region will wrap around; see Figure 3. (This is
necessary to ensure that an adversarial patch at the center of
an image is not more likely to be sampled than one at the
edge of the image.)
Additionally we define STABLEARGSORT of a list to return
the indices that would sort the list in descending order, such
that, in the event of a tie, the lower index is listed first. For
example STABLEARGSORT([3, 23, 23, 7]) = [1, 2, 3, 0].
2.4. Block Smoothing Algorithm
The “block” variation of our algorithm is presented as Al-
gorithm 1. In short, we evaluate the base classifier on all
possible blocks. On each input, rather than simply taking
the maximum class returned by the base classifier, we count
every class for which the logit exceeds a threshold θ. The
classifier can abstain entirely if no class reaches this thresh-
old (for example if the block contains no useful information).
If the gap in the counts between the top class and the next
Algorithm 1 Block Smoothing
Inputs: Base classifier f ∈ SNULLh×w → [0, 1]n,
image x, block size s, attack size m, threshold θ.
Outputs: class c, boolean certified?
Counts← [0...0] (n zeroes)
for all (i, j) in 0 ≤ i < w, 0 ≤ j < h do
Logits← f(ABLATEblock(x, s, (i, j)))
for all k in 0 ≤ k < n do
if Logits[k] > θ then
Counts[k]+ = 1
end if
end for
end for
AffectedBlocks← (m+ s− 1)2
SortedClasses← STABLEARGSORT(Counts)
c← SortedClasses[0]
cnext ← SortedClasses[1]
if Counts[c] > Counts[cnext]+2×AffectedBlocks then
certified?← True
else if Counts[c] = Counts[cnext] + 2 × AffectedBlocks
and c < cnext then
certified?← True
else
certified?← False
end if
Return c, certified?
class is greater than twice the number of classifications
which could possibly be affected by an m×m adversarial
patch, then we can certify that no such patch can change the
final smoothed classification output c. During training, as in
prior smoothing works, we train f on ablated samples, using
a single randomly-determined ablation pattern (selection of
block to retain) on all samples in each batch.
Theorem 1. For any image x, base classifier f , smoothing
block size s, and threshold θ, if Algorithm 1 returns class c
on input x and certifies this classification, then Algorithm
1 will return class c on all inputs x′ that differ from x only
within an m×m region of pixels.
Proof. Let (i′, j′) represent the upper-right corner of the
m×m patch in which x and x′ differ. Note that the output
of ABLATEblock(x, s, (i, j)) will be equal to the output of
ABLATEblock(x′, s, (i, j)), unless the s × s block retained
(starting at (i, j)) intersects with them×m adversarial patch
(starting at (i′, j′)). This condition occurs only when both i
is in the range between i′ − s+ 1 and i′ +m− 1, inclusive,
and j is in the range between j′ − s + 1 and j′ + m − 1,
inclusive. Note that there are (s+m− 1) values each for i
and j which meet this condition, and therefore (s+m−1)2
such pairs (i, j). Therefore ABLATEblock(x′, s, (i, j)) =
ABLATEblock(x, s, (i, j) in all but (s+m− 1)2 cases.
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(If i′ − s+ 1 < 0, then the intersecting values for i, taking
into account the wrapping behavior of the ABLATE operator,
will be h− (i′− s+ 1) through h and 0 through i′+m− 1:
there are still (s + m − 1) such values, and similar logic
applies to j′.)
As a consequence, f(ABLATEblock(x, s, (i, j))) will equal
f(ABLATEblock(x′, s, (i, j))) in all but (s+m− 1)2 cases,
so the Counts which are incremented will be the same in
all but at most (s+m− 1)2 (= AffectedBlocks) iterations.
Let Countsx and Countsx′ represent the state of the Counts
array after the main loop of the algorithm on inputs x and
x′, respectively, and similarly define cx, cx′ , and cnextx.
Because, for each class k, Counts[k] is incremented by at
most 1 per iteration, we have that:
|Countsx[k]− Countsx′ [k]| ≤ AffectedBlocks. (3)
If Countsx[cx] > Countsx[cnextx ] + 2 × AffectedBlocks,
then by sorting, we have that for all classes k 6= cx,
Countsx[cx] > Countsx[k] + 2×AffectedBlocks. Then by
Equation 3, Countsx′ [cx] > Countsx′ [k], and so cx′ = cx.
If Countsx[cx] = Countsx[cnextx ] + 2 × AffectedBlocks
and cx < cnextx then for all k 6= cx, Countsx[cx] ≥
Countsx[k] + 2 × AffectedBlocks. In the inequality
case, we already have that Countsx′ [cx] > Countsx′ [k].
For the equality case, consider any class k for which
Countsx[cx] = Countsx[k]+2×AffectedBlocks. Note that
Countsx[cnextx ] = Countsx[k] and also, by stable sorting of
Countsx, cnextx ≤ k. Then because cx < cnextx , we have
that cx < k. By Equation 3, Countsx′ [cx] ≥ Countsx′ [k].
Then, by stable sorting of Countsx′ , cx′ = cx
2.5. Column Smoothing Algorithm
The column version of our algorithm is presented as Al-
gorithm 2. (An algorithm using rows rather than columns
can be derived by simply transposing the input). Note that
this algorithm is nearly identical to the block variation: the
difference is that we only need to consider w rows rather
than hw blocks. Formally, we claim that:
Theorem 2. For any image x, base classifier f , smoothing
column size s, and threshold θ, if Algorithm 2 returns class
c on input x and certifies this classification, then Algorithm
2 will return class c on all inputs x′ that differ from x only
within an m×m region of pixels.
This theorem can be proved similarly to Theorem 1.
2.6. Changes from Standard Randomized Smoothing
In conventional randomized smoothing algorithms (Lecuyer
et al., 2019; Levine & Feizi, 2019a; Cohen et al., 2019;
Salman et al., 2019), rather than computing the probability
that f returns each class directly by exhaustive iteration,
Algorithm 2 Band (Column) Smoothing
Inputs: Base classifier f ∈ SNULLh×w → [0, 1]n,
image x, column size s, attack size m, threshold θ.
Outputs: class c, boolean certified?
Counts← [0...0] (n zeroes)
for all i in 0 ≤ i < w do
Logits← f(ABLATEcol.(x, s, i))
for all k in 0 ≤ k < n do
if Logits[k] > θ then
Counts[k]+ = 1
end if
end for
end for
AffectedBands← m+ s− 1
SortedClasses← STABLEARGSORT(Counts)
c← SortedClasses[0]
cnext ← SortedClasses[1]
if Counts[c] > Counts[cnext] + 2×AffectedBands then
certified?← True
else if Counts[c] = Counts[cnext] + 2 × AffectedBands
and c < cnext then
certified?← True
else
certified?← False
end if
Return c, certified?
one must instead lower-bound, with high confidence, the
probability pc that f returns the plurality class c and upper-
bound the probabilities pc′ that f returns all other classes,
based on samples. This leads to decreased certified accuracy
due to estimation error. Additionally, all of these bounds
must hold simultaneously: in order to ensure with high
confidence that the gap between pc and pc′ is sufficiently
large for each c′ to prove robustness, one must bound the
population probabilities for every class. (Lecuyer et al.,
2019) does this directly using a union bound, leading to
increased error as the number of classes increases. However,
later works, following (Cohen et al., 2019), use a simpler
method: one only needs to use samples to lower-bound the
probability pc that the base classifier returns the top class.
One can then upper bound all other class probabilities by
observing that ∀c′, pc′ ≤ 1 − pc. In other words, rather
than determining whether c will stay the plurality class at
an adversarial point, one instead determines whether c will
stay the majority class. This works well if the probability
that f returns a class other than c is concentrated in a single
“runner-up” class, which (Cohen et al., 2019) finds to be
typical, at least in the L2 smoothing case. This is also the
estimation method used by (Levine & Feizi, 2019a) for L0
certificates: this is why, when describing that method in
the Section 2.1, we gave the condition for certification as
pc > 0.5 + ∆. In our deterministic method, we can use a
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less strict condition, that ∀c′, pc − pc′ > 2∆. (As detailed
in the above proof, we can sometimes even certify in the
equality case, if it is assured that, by stable sorting, c will
be selected if there is a tie between the class probabilities at
the distorted point.)
In this work, we sidestep the estimation problem entirely by
computing the population probabilities exactly. However,
by avoiding the assumption of (Cohen et al., 2019), that all
probability not assigned to c is instead assigned to a single
adversarial class, we can make an important additional op-
timization: we can add an ‘abstain’ option. If there is no
compelling evidence for any particular class in an ablated
image (i.e., if all logits are below a threshold value θ), our
classifier abstains, not incrementing the ‘Counts’ for any
class. This prevents blocks which contain no information
from being assigned to an arbitrary, likely incorrect class.
Table 5 shows that this significantly increases the certified
accuracy. Our threshold system also allows the base classi-
fier to select multiple classes, if there is strong evidence for
each of them. This is intended to increase certified accuracy
in the case of a large number of classes (i.e., ImageNet),
where the top-1 accuracy of the base classifier might be very
low: if the correct class consistently occurs within the top
several classes, it may still be possible to certify robustness.
3. Results
3.1. MNIST, CIFAR-10, ImageNet
Certified robustness against patch attacks is presented for
5 × 5 patches on MNIST and CIFAR-10 in Tables 5 and
4, respectively, and for ImageNet for 42 × 42 patches in
Table 3. On MNIST and CIFAR-10, we tested using both
block and column smoothing, for all block/column sizes
for which certificates are mathematically possible (∆ < .5).
(On MNIST, we also tested smoothing with rows rather
than columns, with slightly worse results: this is presented
in Appendix A.) On ImageNet (Table 3), we tested with
column smoothing, as this worked best for both CIFAR-10
and MNIST. We selected to use columns of width 25, on the
rough intuition that, averaging over CIFAR-10 and MNIST,
the optimal column width for smoothing was at s = .6m:
further exploration of this parameter space would likely
yield improved certificates on ImageNet.
3.2. Advantages due to De-randomization
As discussed in Section 2.6, there are two benefits to de-
randomization: first, we can eliminate estimation error, and
second, it allows the classifier to abstain or select multiple
classes without complicating estimation. In order to dis-
tinguish these effects, we present in Table 6 the MNIST
column certificates using randomized column smoothing
(with the estimation scheme from (Cohen et al., 2019)), ver-
Clean Certified
Accuracy Accuracy
s = 25, θ = 0.1 44.0% 12.0%
s = 25, θ = 0.2 43.1% 14.5%
s = 25, θ = 0.3 42.3% 13.8%
s = 25, θ = 0.4 40.9% 12.3%
Table 3. Certified robustness to 42× 42 patch adversarial attacks
using Column smoothing on ImageNet, with column width s = 25.
We test on 1000 images from the ILSVRC2012 validation set.
Block Size s Clean Certified
Accuracy Accuracy
1 14.53% 12.29%
2 30.08% 21.27%
3 41.95% 28.19%
4 28.86% 19.35%
5 58.52% 38.04%
6 68.58% 46.06%
7 71.99% 47.61%
8 74.87% 50.16%
9 79.08% 53.34%
10 82.42% 54.67%
11 84.79% 55.22%
12 86.44% 55.69%
13 88.22% 54.84%
14 89.67% 54.90%
15 52.99% 90.86%
16 91.96% 49.94%
17 92.28% 45.21%
18 93.56% 34.10%
Column Size s Clean Certified
Accuracy Accuracy
1 72.63% 51.11%
2 77.49% 54.05%
3 81.78% 56.72%
4 83.93% 57.83%
5 85.94% 56.01%
6 87.85% 56.22%
7 89.58% 54.63%
8 90.49% 53.03%
9 91.19% 50.6%
10 91.46% 49.64%
11 92.27% 46.67%
Table 4. Certified robustness to 5 × 5 patch adversarial attacks
using Block and Column smoothing on CIFAR-10. Values with
highest certified accuracies are shown in bold. Note that some
models achieve over 90% clean accuracy with over 50% certified
robust accuracy. For each configuration, we report accuracies
using the θ ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4} that yields the highest certified
accuracy: results for all θ’s are in Appendix C.
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Block Size s θ = .2 θ = .3 θ = .4 Top-1 class (no threshold)
Clean Certified Clean Certified Clean Certified Clean Certified
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
1, 2, 3 9.80% 0.00% 9.80% 0.00% 9.80% 0.00% 11.35% 11.35%
4 87.45% 38.15% 86.10% 29.75% 85.95% 19.08% 13.30% 11.35%
5 91.35% 42.66% 90.26% 36.58% 90.43% 26.76% 21.61% 11.58%
6 93.25% 42.67% 92.72% 40.09% 92.61% 33.35% 31.37% 12.23%
7 94.76% 43.86% 94.23% 42.03% 94.29% 35.96% 50.85% 13.69%
8 95.94% 44.00% 95.39% 42.27% 95.44% 36.97% 76.08% 17.81%
9 96.72% 42.04% 96.70% 41.69% 96.61% 37.06% 91.11% 26.58%
10 97.32% 39.98% 97.07% 40.22% 97.09% 36.14% 95.41% 35.27%
11 97.64% 36.67% 97.47% 37.18% 97.46% 32.57% 96.37% 31.65%
12 97.99% 33.42% 97.84% 34.49% 97.93% 30.26% 96.84% 27.20%
13 98.22% 28.66% 98.13% 29.06% 98.25% 22.71% 97.83% 27.79%
14 98.56% 22.24% 98.48% 18.63% 98.48% 14.44% 98.31% 24.16%
15 98.71% 9.13% 98.67% 7.72% 98.7% 5.88% 98.58% 13.02%
Column Size s θ = .2 θ = .3 θ = .4 Top-1 class (no threshold)
1 93.35% 47.29% 93.13% 47.8% 92.43% 45.64% 50.15% 15.22%
2 96.54% 51.13% 96.66% 52.83% 96.25% 51.81% 72.90% 19.35%
3 97.67% 45.50% 97.49% 46.92% 97.26% 38.52% 81.90% 19.55%
4 97.73% 38.40% 97.67% 32.34% 97.70% 31.72% 84.96% 19.80%
5 98.12% 32.35% 98.11% 25.05% 98.02% 24.66% 93.01% 21.21%
6 98.36% 27.31% 98.26% 20.4% 98.20% 19.81% 95.44% 22.33%
7 98.52% 13.59% 98.53% 15.13% 98.46% 15.27% 97.40% 20.37%
8 98.66% 9.53% 98.60% 10.90% 98.63% 11.15% 97.79% 19.16%
9 98.72% 6.31% 98.72% 7.81% 98.64% 8.16% 98.29% 17.58%
Table 5. Certified robustness to 5 × 5 patch adversarial attacks using Block and Column smoothing on MNIST. Values with highest
certified accuracies are shown in bold.
sus deterministic column smoothing without abstentions or
multiple-selections: that is to say, counting just the top-1
class returned by the base classifier. The “Top-1” determin-
istic values are also presented in Table 5, on the right. We
see that, while determinism alone provides some benefit, the
thresholding system provides ane even greater improvement.
Column Size s Deterministic Randomized
Top-1 Class Ablation
1 15.22% 12.41%
2 19.35% 14.55%
3 19.55% 15.46%
4 19.80% 15.32%
5 21.21% 15.56%
6 22.33% 16.48%
7 20.37% 14.79%
8 19.16% 14.97%
9 17.58% 14.12%
Table 6. Comparison of certified accuracy using deterministic ver-
sus randomized column smoothing. Figures are for 5× 5 adver-
sarial patches on MNIST. Note that randomized certificates are
probabilistic, with 95% confidence.
Clean Certified
Accuracy Accuracy
2 columns, s = 1 96.39% 39.19%
2 columns, s = 2 98.26% 31.08%
3 columns, s = 1 97.65% 9.04%
2 blocks, s = 4 92.29% 43.45%
3 blocks, s = 4 95.04% 41.59%
4 blocks, s = 4 96.12% 38.51%
Table 7. Multi-column and multi-block certificates. For each con-
figuration, we report accuracies using the θ ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4} that
yields the highest certified accuracy: results for all θ’s are in Ap-
pendix B. Results are on MNIST, for 5× 5 patches.
3.3. Multiple Blocks, Multiple Bands
In Section 2.2, we argued for using a single contiguous
group of pixels on the grounds that, compared to selecting
individual pixels, it provides for a smaller risk of intersect-
ing the adversarial patch. However, there may be some
benefit to getting information from multiple distinct areas
of an image, even if there is some associated increase in
∆. Rather than just looking at the extremes of entirely in-
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dependent pixels (Table 2) versus a single band or block
(Table 5) we also explored, on MNIST, the intermediate
case of using a small number of bands or blocks (Table
7). We show all mathematically possible multiple-column
certificates on MNIST, as well as several certificates for
multiple-blocks with s = 4. Note that in order to avoid over-
lapping columns/blocks we select columns/blocks aligned
to a grid: details on the certificates (which are deterministic)
are provided in Appendix D. Interestingly, while the cer-
tificates using multiple columns are far below optimal, the
certified accuracy for two blocks is only marginally below
the best single-block certified accuracy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed two related methods for image
classification which are provably robust to patch adversar-
ial attacks. These methods, which are adaptations of ran-
domized smoothing, far exceed the current state-of-the-art
certified accuracy to patch attacks on CIFAR-10. One of
our methods, column smoothing, provides certified robust-
ness on ImageNet comparable to the empirical robustness
of state-of-the-art empirical defenses against patch attacks,
with very little parameter tuning: it is likely possible to tune
this technique to provide even greater certified accuracy.
References
Blum, A., Dick, T., Manoj, N., and Zhang, H. Ran-
dom smoothing might be unable to certify `∞ ro-
bustness for high-dimensional images. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2002.03517, 2020.
Brown, T. B., Man, D., Roy, A., Abadi, M., and Gilmer, J.
Adversarial patch, 2017.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. Towards evaluating the robust-
ness of neural networks. In 2017 38th IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
Chiang, P., Ni, R., Abdelkader, A., Zhu, C., Studor, C., and
Goldstein, T. Certified defenses for adversarial patches.
In International Conference on Learning Representations,
2020. URL https://openreview.net/forum?
id=HyeaSkrYPH.
Cohen, J., Rosenfeld, E., and Kolter, Z. Certified adversarial
robustness via randomized smoothing. In International
Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 1310–1320, 2019.
Eykholt, K., Evtimov, I., Fernandes, E., Li, B., Rahmati, A.,
Xiao, C., Prakash, A., Kohno, T., and Song, D. Robust
physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classifica-
tion. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, pp. 1625–1634, 2018.
Gowal, S., Dvijotham, K., Stanforth, R., Bunel, R., Qin,
C., Uesato, J., Arandjelovic, R., Mann, T., and Kohli,
P. On the effectiveness of interval bound propagation
for training verifiably robust models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1810.12715, 2018.
Hayes, J. On visible adversarial perturbations & digital
watermarking. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops,
pp. 1597–1604, 2018.
Karmon, D., Zoran, D., and Goldberg, Y. Lavan: Lo-
calized and visible adversarial noise. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1801.02608, 2018.
Kumar, A., Levine, A., Goldstein, T., and Feizi, S. Curse of
dimensionality on randomized smoothing for certifiable
robustness. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.03239, 2020.
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. J., and Bengio, S. Adversarial
examples in the physical world. In Artificial Intelligence
Safety and Security, pp. 99–112. Chapman and Hall/CRC,
2018.
Lecuyer, M., Atlidakis, V., Geambasu, R., Hsu, D.,
and Jana, S. Certified robustness to adversarial
examples with differential privacy. In 2019 2019
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp.
726–742, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, may 2019. IEEE
Computer Society. doi: 10.1109/SP.2019.00044. URL
https://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/
10.1109/SP.2019.00044.
Lee, G.-H., Yuan, Y., Chang, S., and Jaakkola, T. S.
Tight certificates of adversarial robustness for randomly
smoothed classifiers. arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.04948,
2019.
Levine, A. and Feizi, S. Robustness certificates for sparse ad-
versarial attacks by randomized ablation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1911.09272, 2019a.
Levine, A. and Feizi, S. Wasserstein smoothing: Certified
robustness against wasserstein adversarial attacks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1910.10783, 2019b.
Levine, A., Singla, S., and Feizi, S. Certifiably ro-
bust interpretation in deep learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1905.12105, 2019.
Li, B., Chen, C., Wang, W., and Carin, L. Second-order ad-
versarial attack and certifiable robustness. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1809.03113, 2018.
Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D., and
Vladu, A. Towards deep learning models resistant to
adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083,
2017.
(De)Randomized Smoothing for Certifiable Defense against Patch Attacks
Naseer, M., Khan, S., and Porikli, F. M. Local gradients
smoothing: Defense against localized adversarial attacks.
2019 IEEE Winter Conference on Applications of Com-
puter Vision (WACV), pp. 1300–1307, 2018.
Rosenfeld, E., Winston, E., Ravikumar, P., and Kolter, J. Z.
Certified robustness to label-flipping attacks via random-
ized smoothing. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.03018, 2020.
Salman, H., Yang, G., Li, J., Zhang, P., Zhang, H., Razen-
shteyn, I., and Bubeck, S. Provably robust deep learn-
ing via adversarially trained smoothed classifiers. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1906.04584, 2019.
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan,
D., Goodfellow, I., and Fergus, R. Intriguing properties of
neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
Teng, J., Lee, G.-H., and Yuan, Y. $\ell 1$ adversarial ro-
bustness certificates: a randomized smoothing approach,
2020. URL https://openreview.net/forum?
id=H1lQIgrFDS.
Yang, G., Duan, T., Hu, E., Salman, H., Razenshteyn, I.,
and Li, J. Randomized smoothing of all shapes and sizes.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.08118, 2020.
(De)Randomized Smoothing for Certifiable Defense against Patch Attacks
A. Results for Row Smoothing
We tested smoothing with rows, rather than columns, on
MNIST. This resulted in slightly lower certified accuracy
under 5× 5 patch attacks (45.35% certified accuracy, versus
53.98% using column smoothing). Full results are presented
in Table 8.
B. Results for Multi-column and Multi-block
Smoothing for All Tested Values of
Parameter θ
In Table 9, we present complete results for multi-column
and multi-block smoothing on MNIST, for all tested values
of threshold parameter θ.
C. Results on CIFAR-10 for All Tested Values
of Parameter θ
In Table 12, we present complete results on CIFAR-10, for
all tested values of threshold parameter θ.
D. Certificates for Multi-column and
Multi-block Smoothing
For smoothing with multiple blocks or multiple columns, we
consider only blocks or columns aligned to a grid starting
at the upper-left corner of the image. For example, if using
block size s = 4, we consider only retaining blocks with
upper-left corner (i, j), where i and j are both multiples
of 4. This prevents retained blocks from overlapping, and
also reduces the (large) number of possible selections of
multiple blocks, allowing for derandomized smoothing. Let
the number of retained blocks or bands be κ, and, as in the
paper, let the block or band size be s, the image size be
h× w, and the adversarial patch size be m×m.
For the block case, note that there are dh/se × dw/se such
axis-aligned blocks. Of these, the adversarial patch will
overlap at most (d(m− 1)/se+ 1)2 blocks. For example,
for a 5 × 5 adversarial patch, using block size s = 4, the
adversarial patch will overlap exactly 4 blocks, regardless
of position: see Figure 4. When performing derandomized
smoothing, we classify all
(dh/se×dw/se
κ
)
possible choices
of κ blocks. Of these classifications, at least(dhs e × dws e − (dm−1s e+ 1)2
κ
)
will use none of the at most (d(m − 1)/se + 1)2 blocks
which may be affected by the adversary. Therefore, the
number of classifications which might be affected by the
adversary is at most:(dhs e × dws e
κ
)
−
(dhs e × dws e − (dm−1s e+ 1)2
κ
)
.
Figure 4. Multi-block smoothing: for a 5 × 5 adversarial patch,
using block size s = 4, the adversarial patch will overlap exactly
4 blocks, regardless of position. Individual pixels are represented
by black gridlines. Blocks that may be retained are outlined in
blue, and a selection of three possible 5×5 adversarial patches are
shown in red. Note that this is exact because, in this case, m− 1 is
divisible by s: in other cases, certain choices of adversarial patches
may affect fewer than (d(m− 1)/se+ 1)2 blocks.
We can then use the above quantity in place of the vari-
able AffectedBlocks in the certification algorithm (Algo-
rithm 1). This modification, in addition to classifying all(dh/se×dw/se
κ
)
selections of κ axis-aligned blocks, is suffi-
cient to adapt the certification algorithm to a multi-block
setting.
The column case is similar: there are dw/se axis-aligned
bands (defined as bands which start at a column index which
is a multiple of s). Of these, the adversarial patch will
overlap at most (d(m−1)/se+1) bands. When performing
smoothing, we classify all
(dw/se
κ
)
possible choices of κ
bands. Of these classifications, at least(dws e − (dm−1s e+ 1)
κ
)
will use none of the at most (d(m−1)/se+ 1) bands which
may be affected by the adversary. Therefore, the number of
classifications which might be affected by the adversary is
at most: (dws e
κ
)
−
(dws e − (dm−1s e+ 1)
κ
)
.
Full results for multi-block and multi-band smoothing are
shown in Table 9.
E. Architecture and Training Details
As discussed in the paper, we used the method introduced
by (Levine & Feizi, 2019a) to represent images with pixels
ablated: this requires increasing the number of input chan-
nels from one to two for greyscale images (MNIST) and
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Row Size s θ = .2 θ = .3 θ = .4
1 88.39% 36.29% 84.75% 33.67% 82.73% 25.46%
2 95.37% 43.25% 93.66% 45.35% 91.89% 42.99%
3 96.13% 41.43% 94.88% 44.76% 93.85% 43.98%
4 96.86% 38.37% 96.09% 42.13% 95.30% 42.05%
5 97.31% 35.38% 96.61% 39.09% 96.05% 39.89%
6 97.26% 31.91% 96.78% 36.53% 96.46% 37.02%
7 97.71% 26.99% 97.28% 32.71% 97.09% 33.43%
8 97.92% 22.76% 97.77% 28.03% 97.64% 29.46%
9 97.93% 17.47% 97.62% 23.90% 97.62% 25.31%
Table 8. Certified robustness to 5× 5 patch adversarial attacks using Row smoothing on MNIST. Values with highest certified accuracies
are shown in bold.
θ = .2 θ = .3 θ = .4
Clean Certified Clean Certified Clean Certified
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
2 columns, s = 1 96.57% 38.00% 96.39% 39.19% 96.15% 37.18%
2 columns, s = 2 98.26% 31.08% 98.09% 25.01% 98.05% 25.13%
3 columns, s = 1 97.67% 7.35% 97.65% 9.04% 97.56% 8.90%
2 blocks, s = 4 92.29% 43.45% 91.31% 38.68% 91.16% 29.57%
3 blocks, s = 4 95.04% 41.59% 94.45% 39.27% 94.35% 32.66%
4 blocks, s = 4 96.12% 38.51% 95.68% 37.50% 95.60% 31.89%
Table 9. Multi-column and multi-block certificates, with results shown for all tested values of parameter θ. Results are on MNIST, for
5× 5 patches.
Training Epochs 400
Batch Size 128
Optimizer Stochastic Gradient
Descent with Momentum
Learning Rate .01 (Epochs 1-200)
.001 (Epochs 201-400)
Momentum 0.9
L2 Weight Penalty 0.0005
Table 10. Training Parameters for MNIST
Training Epochs 350
Batch Size 128
Training Set Random Cropping (Padding:4)
Preprocessing and Random Horizontal Flip
Optimizer Stochastic Gradient
Descent with Momentum
Learning Rate .1 (Epochs 1-150)
.01 (Epochs 151-250)
.001 (Epochs 251-350)
Momentum 0.9
L2 Weight Penalty 0.0005
Table 11. Training Parameters for CIFAR-10
from three to six for color images. For MNIST, we used the
simple CNN architecture from the released code of (Levine
& Feizi, 2019a), consisting of two convolutional layers and
three fully-connected layers. For CIFAR-10 and ImageNet,
we used modified versions ResNet-18 and ResNet-50, re-
spectively, with the number of input channels increased to
six. Training details are presented in Tables 10, 11 and 13.
For randomized smoothing experiments, we follow the em-
pirical estimation methods proposed by (Cohen et al., 2019).
We certify to 95% confidence, using 1000 random samples
to select the putative top class, and 10000 random samples
to lower-bound the probability of this class. For sparse ran-
domized ablation on MNIST, we use released pretrained
models from (Levine & Feizi, 2019a).
F. Proof for Column Smoothing Algorithm
(Theorem 2)
For completeness, we include a proof of the correctness of
the Column smoothing algorithm (Algorithm 2). This is
very similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. Let (i′, j′) represent the upper-right corner of the
m ×m patch in which x and x′ differ. Note that the out-
put of ABLATEcol.(x, s, i) will be equal to the output of
ABLATEcol.(x′, s, i), unless the band (of width s) retained,
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Block Size s θ = .2 θ = .3 θ = .4
Clean Certified Clean Certified Clean Certified
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
1 14.53% 12.29% 14.28% 12.18% 13.28% 10.45%
2 30.08% 21.27% 25.60% 17.18% 22.61% 13.95%
3 41.95% 28.19% 36.62% 24.48% 32.79% 18.51%
4 28.86% 19.35% 31.22% 19.06% 32.29% 17.33%
5 58.52% 38.04% 57.80% 36.18% 56.03% 29.81%
6 68.58% 46.06% 67.82% 44.51% 66.32% 39.03%
7 71.99% 47.61% 71.87% 47.45% 71.32% 42.96%
8 75.20% 49.79% 74.87% 50.16% 75.61% 47.13%
9 79.30% 52.66% 79.08% 53.34% 79.49% 50.50%
10 82.40% 53.59% 82.42% 54.67% 82.89% 52.31%
11 84.48% 53.43% 84.79% 55.22% 84.95% 53.12%
12 86.39% 53.31% 86.44% 55.69% 86.83% 54.52%
13 88.32% 52.35% 88.22% 54.84% 88.65% 54.08%
14 89.66% 51.77% 89.67% 54.90% 89.94% 53.94%
15 90.63% 50.05% 90.69% 52.99% 90.86% 52.85%
16 91.91% 46.46% 91.94% 49.68% 91.96% 49.94%
17 91.94% 40.85% 92.14% 44.64% 92.28% 45.21%
18 93.42% 29.24% 93.49% 33.10% 93.56% 34.10%
Column Size s θ = .2 θ = .3 θ = .4
1 72.78% 50.51% 72.63% 51.11% 73.11% 50.19%
2 77.56% 53.33% 77.49% 54.05% 77.75% 53.05%
3 81.75% 55.98% 81.78% 56.72% 81.80% 55.95%
4 83.86% 56.25% 83.93% 57.83% 84.05% 57.08%
5 86.02% 55.25% 85.94% 56.01% 86.03% 55.90%
6 87.80% 54.76% 87.85% 56.22% 88.06% 56.12%
7 89.47% 53.32% 89.58% 54.63% 89.46% 54.50%
8 90.51% 51.56% 90.49% 53.03% 90.45% 53.01%
9 91.30% 48.30% 91.18% 50.41% 91.19% 50.6%
10 91.56% 46.34% 91.49% 49.02% 91.46% 49.64%
11 92.37% 41.86% 92.33% 45.84% 92.27% 46.67%
Table 12. Certified robustness to 5× 5 patch adversarial attacks using Block and Column smoothing on CIFAR-10, with results shown for
all tested values of parameter θ. Values with highest certified accuracies are shown in bold.
Training Epochs 60
Batch Size 196
Training Set Random Horizontal Flip
Preprocessing
Optimizer Stochastic Gradient
Descent with Momentum
Learning Rate .1 (Epochs 1-20)
.01 (Epochs 21-40)
.001 (Epochs 41-60)
Momentum 0.9
L2 Weight Penalty 0.0005
Table 13. Training Parameters for ImageNet
starting at column i, intersects with the m×m adversarial
patch (starting at (i′, j′)). This condition occurs only when
both i is in the range between i′ − s + 1 and i′ + m − 1,
inclusive. Note that there are (s+m−1) values for i which
meet this condition. Therefore ABLATEcol.(x′, s, i) =
ABLATEcol.(x, s, i) in all but (s+m− 1) cases.
(If i′ − s+ 1 < 0, then the intersecting values for i, taking
into account the wrapping behavior of the ABLATE operator,
will be h− (i′− s+ 1) through h and 0 through i′+m− 1:
there are still (s+m− 1) such values.)
As a consequence, f(ABLATEcol.(x, s, i)) will equal
f(ABLATEcol.(x′, s, i)) in all but (s + m − 1) cases, so
the Counts which are incremented will be the same in all
but at most (s+m− 1) (= AffectedBands) iterations. Let
Countsx and Countsx′ represent the state of the Counts ar-
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ray after the main loop of the algorithm on inputs x and x′,
respectively, and similarly define cx, cx′ , and cnextx. Be-
cause, for each class k, Counts[k] is incremented by at most
1 per iteration, we have that:
|Countsx[k]− Countsx′ [k]| ≤ AffectedBands. (4)
If Countsx[cx] > Countsx[cnextx ] + 2 × AffectedBands,
then by sorting, we have that for all classes k 6= cx,
Countsx[cx] > Countsx[k] + 2× AffectedBands. Then by
Equation 4, Countsx′ [cx] > Countsx′ [k], and so cx′ = cx.
If Countsx[cx] = Countsx[cnextx ] + 2 × AffectedBands
and cx < cnextx then for all k 6= cx, Countsx[cx] ≥
Countsx[k] + 2 × AffectedBands. In the inequality
case, we already have that Countsx′ [cx] > Countsx′ [k].
For the equality case, consider any class k for which
Countsx[cx] = Countsx[k] + 2×AffectedBands. Note that
Countsx[cnextx ] = Countsx[k] and also, by stable sorting of
Countsx, cnextx ≤ k. Then because cx < cnextx , we have
that cx < k. By Equation 4, Countsx′ [cx] ≥ Countsx′ [k].
Then, by stable sorting of Countsx′ , cx′ = cx
